

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

----- 064228

O P 151751 Z MAR 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9372

INFO USDEL SALT TWO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1322

EXDIS

SALT

E. O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, SALT, NATO

SUBJECT: SALT: STATEMENT TO NAC OF MARCH 15

SECSTATE PLEASE PASS SECDEF

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S MARCH 15 STATEMENT
TO THE COUNCIL.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. I AM VERY PLEASED TO BE HERE TODAY TO CONTINUE THESE
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE COUNCIL ON SALT. I KNOW HOW VALUABLE
AMBASSADOR SMITH FOUND THE FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH HAS
CHARACTERIZED THESE SESSIONS, AND I INTEND TO MAINTAIN THE
TRADITION OF FULL AND FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS. AS THE NEW
CHIEF OF THE U. S. DELEGATION, I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR WORK
TOGETHER AND I WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE COMPLEX
ISSUES WHICH CONFRONT US.

II

2. IN HIS STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 15, AMBASSADOR FARLEY
NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD REPORT LATER
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ON ANY SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE FINAL WEEK AT
SALT TWO- I. THEREFORE, I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS

SINCE OUR LAST REPORT TO THE COUNCIL.

3. THERE WERE FOUR ITEMS OF NOTE WHICH EMERGED DURING THE FINAL WEEK AT GENEVA. FIRST, THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED THE BOTH SIDES ASSUME OBLIGATIONS NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES. IN THEIR VIEW, THESE OBLIGATIONS WOULD FOLLOW ALONG THE LINES OF THE NON- TRANSFER PROVISION OF THE ABM TREATY.

WE CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO OUR STATEMENT OF APRIL 18, 1972, THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX OF THE ABM TREATY DID NOT SET A PRECEDENT FOR A COMPARABLE PROVISION IN AN AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE SOVIET SIDE, HOWEVER, SAID THEY LOOKED UPON THE QUESTION OF NON- TRANSFER AS BEING OF GREAT IMPORTANCE EVEN DURING THE PERIOD WHILE A MORE COMPLETE AGREEMENT WAS BEING WORKED OUT.

4. WE DO NOT INTEND TO RAISE THE NON- TRANSFER ISSUE. OUR POSITION WAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE THAT WE WILL NOT ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT UNTIL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT.

5. SECOND, AS AMBASSADOR FARLEY REMARKED ON DECEMBER 15, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD INDICATED AN INTEREST IN DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF MIRV LIMITATIONS. THEY RECALLED THAT THE MIRV QUESTION HAD BEEN LEFT FOR DISCUSSION AT FOLLOW- ON TALKS AND ASKED FOR U. S. VIEWS. WE REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS WAS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION AT FUTURE SESSIONS.

6. THE SOVIETS DID NOT PURSUE THIS SUBJECT FURTHER IN FORMAL MEETINGS, BUT IN SEVERAL INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS DURING THE FINAL DAYS, ON MIRVS. WHILE THE SOVIETS DID NOT ADVANCE ANY CONCRETE PROPOSALS, THEY DID NOTE THREE POSSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO MIRV LIMITATIONS; A TOTAL BAN, NO RESTRICTIONS, OR SOME PARTIAL MEASURES. THEY INDICATED INTEREST IN DISCUSSING SOME PARTIAL DEPLOYMENT LIMITATIONS ON MIRVS.

7. NEXT, AS FORECAST BY AMBASSADOR FARLEY, THE U. S. DELEGATION ON DECEMBER 18 STRONGLY REBUTTED THE SOVIET SECRET

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POSITION ON CERTAIN NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS (SOMETIMES CALLED FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS), AN ISSUE WHICH THE U. S. HAS CONSISTENTLY VIEWED AS INVOLVING THE NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS OF BOTH SIDES. THE REBUTTAL CONTAINED THE POINTS MENTIONED ORALLY BY AMBASSADOR FARLEY, AND INCLUDED A REAFFIRMATION OF OUR MAY 24/26 STATEMENTS ON ALLIED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES. WE ARGUED THAT THE MAIN TASK OF SALT IS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THAT TO SINGLE OUT CERTAIN NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS, WHICH THE U. S.

HAS BASED FORWARD IN SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES AND ALLAINCE COMMITMENTS, IS CLEARLY UNEQUAL, TO THE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U. S. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE U. S. POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT.

8. FINALLY, AT THE CONCLUDING SESSION ON DECEMBER 21, THE HEADS OF DELEGATION SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ESTABLISHING THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. A COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF FOR DISTRIBUTION. IN ADDITION, BASIC PARAGRAPHS OF DRAFT REGULATIONS FOR THE SCC WERE INITIALED FOR USE BY THE COMMISSION IN ESTABLISHING ITS PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS. PENDING THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERMANENT U. S. COMMISSIONER, I HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED U. S. COMMISSIONER TO HANDLE ANY MATTERS WHICH MAY ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SCC' S RESPONSIBILITIES. ON MARCH 13, 1973, MINISTER SEMENOV ADVISED ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD APPOINTED BRIGADIER GENERAL G. I. USTINOV AS COMMISSIONER AND MINISTER V. P. KARPOV AS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, ALSO MAKING CLEAR THAT THIS DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN PRIOR TO LEARNING OF MY APPOINTMENT.

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INFO USDEL SALT TWO

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EXDIS

SALT

III

9. IN THE INTERIM SINCE OUR LAST DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL, THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAS PREPARED A USEFUL PAPER SUMMARIZING THE COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS AND WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE DUTCH, FRG AND UK DELEGATIONS. WE HAVE STUDIED THE PAPER AND HAVE FOUND IT, AND THE NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS, MOST HELPFUL IN OUR OWN ANALYSIS OF THE SO- CALLED FBS ISSUE. THESE PAPERS WILL PROVIDE USEFUL

BACKGROUND FOR FUTURE DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF THIS AND RELATED QUESTIONS. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER VIEWS YOU MAY WISH TO PUT FORWARD.

10. THE FIRST TWO MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT REVEALED NEW INSIGHTS INTO THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. THE PRIVATE MEETING WITH SEMENOV ON MONDAY WAS DEVOTED ESSENTIALLY TO GETTING ACQUAINTED AND TO PROCEDURAL ITEMS. SEMENOV'S OPENING STATEMENT ON TUESDAY COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS A PERFUNCTORY REVIEW OF PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING THE RESULTS OF THE MAY SUMMIT MEETING AND NUMEROUS QUOTATIONS FROM OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENTS. HE DID STATE THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVIDES A "GOOD BASIS" FOR PREPARATION OF A MORE COMPLETE AGREEMENT. THIS COULD INDICATE MODIFICATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION AT THE LAST SESSION WHERE THEY INSISTED THAT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT INCLUDE THE
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PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN THE FORM ALREADY AGREED UPON BY THE SIDES.

V

11. AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS PHASE OF SALT TWO, THE U. S. DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A VIGEROUS EFFORT TO ELICIT MORE SPECIFIC SOVIET VIEWS. I WILL SEEK FURTHER SOVIET VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF MIRV LIMITATIONS. WE WILL ENDEAVOR TO ASCERTAIN SOVIET VIEWS ON AGGREGATE LEVELS INCLUDING THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD REDUCTION BELOW THEIR CURRENT LEVEL. ALSO, WE WILL PURSUE DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF SALT IN ENHANCING THE SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES.

12. WE HAVE REPORTED TO YOU THE EXTREME AND UNREALISTIC SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR LIMITATION OF BOMBER ARMAMENTS. IF THE SOVIETS PURSUE THESE PROPOSALS, WE WILL TAKE THE POSITION THAT THEY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED UNLESS THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO PLACE APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON AIR DEFENSES. IF THE SOVIETS RETURN TO THEIR PROPOSALS THAT "RESTRAINT" BE EXERCISED REGARDING NEW STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, WE WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO CONSIDER RESTRAINTS WITHOUT A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS THAT MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

13. AS FAR AS THE U. S. IS CONCERNED, WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO (A) ESTABLISH AN EQUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS FOR EACH SIDE, (B) ESTABLISH AN EQUAL SUB-CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND AN EQUAL CEILING OF THE AGGREGATE THROW WEIGHT OF ICBM FORCES FOR EACH SIDE, AND (C) ASCERTAIN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE ON REDUCTIONS FROM THEIR CURRENT LEVELS.

VI

14. MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS CONCLUDES MY REPORT TO YOU TODAY. AS
HAS BEEN OUR PRACTICE IN THE PAST, I SHALL CIRCULATE MY TEXT,
AND I ASK THAT IT BE TREATED WITH THE UTMOST DISCRETION. I
WOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS AND WILL BE GLAD TO TRY TO RESPOND
TO ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

END TEXT.

RUMSFELD

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